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Regular migration pathways include labour mobility regimes, sponsorship programmes for high-
skilled workers, student visas and protections for refugees. In contrast, irregular migration 
pathways include illegal entry, over-staying a visa and befallen irregularity (where regular status 
is lost) (Vickstrom, 2014). The links between regular (legal) pathways for migration and irregular 
migration are complex, however, two linked assumptions are common in the evidence base for 
this report.  
The first assumption is that destination states’ restrictive migration policies and the lack of regular 
pathways pushes migrants into irregular entry, illegal residence and befallen irregularity (see for 
example, Carrera et al., 2018). The second assumption is that expanding regular migration will 
reduce irregular migration as people would chose to migrate regularly if options were available 
(McAuliffe, 2017). Options for expanding regular pathways include labour mobility regimes, safe 
pathways for refugees and expanding visa options for students and low-skilled workers (Bither & 
Ziebart, 2018). However, it is also possible that expanding regular pathways could result in 
increases in irregular migration and smuggling along specific corridors (McAuliffe, 2017).  
Key findings include: 
• The evidence base is limited for both assumptions and there are only a small number of 
rigorous empirical studies.  
• A lack of comprehensive data on irregular migration and the complex links between 
regular and irregular migration as well as the wider trends driving migration makes it 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of different regular pathways and to attribute 
causality. For example, Germany’s Western Balkans Regulation, which expanded labour 
mobility for low-skilled workers correlates with a decline in the number of asylum claims 
from the Western Balkans. However, it was only one of a package of measures to 
address migration and potential effects varied by country.  
• Restrictive visa and asylum policies can have deflection effects, pushing migrants into 
irregular channels. For example, people seeking protection may choose to migrate 
irregularly due to restrictive policies in destination countries. 
• Labour pathways are the most widely studied in the literature reviewed for this report. 
Limited high-quality evidence was found assessing the effects of expanding family 
migration, migration for education and protection pathways.  
• Labour market dynamics are a strong pull factor for migration, both regular and irregular, 
and can incentivise employers in destination countries to employ irregular workers. 
McAuliffe & Solomon’s (2017) collection highlights how irregular labour migration 
pathways can lead to exploitation and abuse, with women particularly vulnerable.  
This report is based on a series of online keyword searches to identify rigorous, empirical 
evidence assessing the effects of regular migration pathways on irregular ones. A large body of 
academic and grey literature address irregular migration and calls for expanding regular 
pathways are common. However, only a small number of high-quality evidence-based studies 
were identified. These studies include a mix of case studies and quantitative studies using cross-
national datasets. Within this there is a split between those that examine the effects of restrictive 
regular pathways on irregular migration and those that assess the effects of expanding regular 
pathways.  
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 Analysing the relationship between regular and irregular 
migration 
Lack of reliable and meaningful data 
The lack of reliable and comprehensive data on irregular migration stocks and flows makes it 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of new channels of regular migration in discouraging irregular 
flows (Triandafyllidou et al., 2019). Whilst the lack of detailed data on irregular migrants’ 
employment makes it difficult to fully grasp how they interact with labour market dynamics 
(Triandafyllidou et al.,  2019), there is also a lack of quantitative evidence demonstrating how 
legal migration impacts illegal migration (Papademetriou & Sommerville, 2014). Simon, 
Schwartz, Hudson & Johnson (2018) argue that it is difficult to empirically test the assumption 
that restrictive migration policies deflect individuals into irregular migration because of the 
clandestine and often unobservable nature of irregular migration and the problem of attributing 
causality. Irregular migration is difficult to measure, which is why a number of studies conflate 
undocumented border crossing with irregularity (Vickstrom, 2014).  
Czaika and De Hass’ (2013) conceptual paper defines migration policies as rules (i.e. laws, 
regulations and measures) that national states define and implement with the objectives of 
affecting the volume, origin, direction and internal composition of migration flows. It is difficult to 
empirically attribute a change in the volume, timing or composition of migration to a particular 
policy change: the correlation between policy and migration changes does not prove there is a 
casual link (Czaika & de Hass, 2013).  
The limited availability of good migration data and the difficultly of quantifying migration policies 
also makes empirical assessment difficult (Czaika & de Hass, 2013). In order to meaningfully 
analyse immigration policy effectiveness, Czaika and De Haas (2013) argue that knowledge is 
also required of the objectives and interests of multiple stakeholders and the political debates 
and processes that have led to certain immigration policies (Czaika & de Haas, 2013). In terms of 
immigration policies there are often wide gulfs between policy discourses and policy practices, 
including discursive gaps (the discrepancy between public discourses and policies on paper), 
implementation gaps (the discrepancy between policies on paper and their implementation) and 
efficacy gaps (the extent to which implemented policies are able to affect migration) (Czaika & de 
Haas, 2013).  
Attributing causality  
Czaika and De Haas’ (2013) brief review of selected empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
migration policies concludes that whilst policies can significantly alter migration, these effects are 
relatively small compared to other social, economic and political determinants. Factors that 
reduce migration flows in origin countries include demographic change, greater economic 
opportunity and improvements in governance, peace and security (Newland & Riester, 2018). 
For example, Martin (2017) argues that the number of unauthorised workers in the US farm 
workforce decreased between 2000 and 2014 from 55% to 47% due to the arrival of fewer new 
unauthorised workers from Mexico due to the 2008-9 recession, improving conditions in rural 
Mexico and increased US-Mexico border enforcement (Martin, 2017). Consequently, socio-
economic policies should be taken into consideration when conducting empirical analyses of 
immigration policy effectiveness (Czakia & de Hass, 2013).  
Drivers of migration include structural demands for low-skilled workers, international wealth 
inequalities, and conflict in origin countries (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). These are largely beyond 
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the immediate control of destination states (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). Newland and Riester 
(2018) argue that expanding legal pathways will not stop irregular migration: history shows that 
legal and illegal migration stabilise and slow when a complex array of social, economic and 
political factors converge.  
The lack of reliable data also makes it difficult to assess causality (Triandafyllidou et al., 2019). 
Triandafyllidou et al. (2019) argue that more inventive research strategies are needed using a 
comparative case study approach to assess specific phenomena and draw conclusions about 
what works/doesn’t work in terms of policies to discourage/prevent irregular migration and 
encourage regular migration (Triandafyllidou et al., 2019). The nexus between potential irregular 
movements and regular pathways also needs to be studied as the challenge for policy-makers is 
to encourage migrant populations to engage with regular rather than irregular pathways 
(Triandafyllidou et al., 2019).  
Substitution/Deflection effects 
The relationship between irregular and regular pathways is complex. Targeted migration policies 
can have unintended effects on other migration flows through substitution effects, which can limit 
the effectiveness of immigration restrictions (Czaika & de Haas, 2013). Substitution effects 
include spatial (diversion of migration to other countries), categorical (reorientation towards other 
legal or illegal channels), inter-temporal (affecting the timing of migration e.g. encouraging 
migration now due to the expectation of future restrictions) and reverse flows (i.e. reduced return 
migration) (Czaika & de Haas, 2013). Data and research design limitations mean that existing 
studies cannot properly test for substitution effects: as such they may over-estimate the effects of 
policies of migration patterns (Czaika & de Haas, 2013). This highlights the need for more 
empirically informed insights about the short- and long-term effects of migration policies on 
separate migration categories (Czaika & de Hass, 2013).  
Triandafyllidou et al. (2019) policy paper argues that stricter enforcement measures including 
both fencing (border controls) and gatekeeping (visa restriction) policies do appear to slow 
irregular migration. However, they also deflection effects as migrants move to other channels 
including migrant smuggling or applying for asylum (Triandafyllidou et al. 2019). Migrants seeking 
protection may shift to irregular migration instead of asylum seeking if a destination state’s visa 
and asylum policies are restrictive (Triandafyllidou et al. 2019). Papademetriou and Sommerville 
(2014) argue that attempts to stem irregular migration through border security measures can 
deflect migrants to other routes and entry points as economic and family unification incentives to 
migrate often outweigh the deterrent effects of even the most sophisticated and well-resourced 
border controls (Papademetriou & Sommerville, 2014).  
The nature of regular pathways can also deflect migrants into irregularity. For example, a large 
proportion of the US farm workforce are unauthorised Mexican workers, despite the existence of 
temporary work visa schemes (Martin, 2017). A 2017 Migration Policy Institute Brief argues that 
the employer conditions attached to temporary work visas, including the provision of free 
housing, can be linked to the large number of unauthorised workers (Martin, 2017).  Whilst 
Papademetriou and Sommerville (2014) argue that the USA’s backlog of approved family visas 
can encourage family members to immigrate illegally.  
Migrants from Myanmar were previously able to migrate relatively easily to Thailand through 
porous borders (ESCAP, 2018). Despite the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the two countries providing for regular migration pathways into Thailand, many 
migrants were not aware of this or considered it too costly (ESCAP, 2018). As such, migrant 
5 
perceived it as easier to migrate through irregular pathways and obtain a work permit ex-post 
through regularisation campaigns in Thailand (ESCAP, 2018). 
 The effects of limited legal pathways 
Vickstrom (2014) argues that restrictive immigration policies actively produce pathways to 
irregularity. The material effects of increased external controls has been the creation of irregular 
entry flows and the transformation of regular flows into irregular ones (Vickstrom, 2014). 
Restrictive entry policies also produce overstaying by increasing the risks and costs of entry, 
making migrants less likely to depart after arrival (Vickstrom, 2014). Labour market dynamics and 
bureaucracy can also encourage irregular stay and work including employers who see benefits in 
employing cheap, often exploited labour (Triandafyllidou et al., 2019). Irregularity can be 
functional to labour market conditions in specific sectors e.g.  construction, domestic work and 
agriculture, whilst restrictive requirements for stay and work can indirectly support unscrupulous 
employers (Triandafyllidou at al.,2019). Research suggests that status flows into irregularity 
(over-staying or befallen irregularity) are the predominant pathways into irregularity, as opposed 
to geographic flows (i.e. illegal border entry) (Vickstrom, 2014). 
Effects of restrictive asylum and visa policies on irregular 
migration to Europe 
Czaika and Hobolth (2016) argue that irregular migration and asylum migration are linked (for 
example, if entry visas are scare, migrants seeking asylum may turn to irregular travel and entry), 
however the precise causal nature of the relationship is debated. Following irregular entry, 
asylum seeking migrants face two choices: whether or not to apply for asylum, and, whether to 
stay or return if they receive a negative asylum decision (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). A number of 
factors affect both decisions including the policies and procedures of the destination country and 
the economic capabilities of the migrant (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016).  
Czaika and Hobolth’s (2016) analysis of the interplay between asylum and visa policies and the 
number of irregular migrants arriving and over-staying in 29 European countries in the 2000s 
found that restrictive policies were related to significant deflections into irregularity. Their 
estimates suggest a 10% increase in asylum rejections raises the number of apprehended 
irregular migrants by an average of 2-4%, whilst a 10% increase in short-stay visa rejections 
leads to a 4-7% increase in irregular border entries (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). Restrictive asylum 
policies increase irregular stay, whilst short-stay visa rejections partly result in a deflection into 
irregular entry routes (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). Diaspora communities can play a role in 
facilitating irregular stay (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016).  
The study drew on a large three-dimensional (origin country, destination country, year) cross-
national comparative dataset detailing apprehensions of irregular migrants at the border and on 
the territory of 29 European destination countries (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). Asylum policy 
restrictiveness was operationalised by using UNHCR data on the number of nationality-specific 
(bilateral) asylum rejections, whilst migration policy restrictiveness was captured by the number 
of nationality-specific visa refusals: the dataset also accounted for changes in immigration 
policies (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). Using absolute numbers of asylum and visa rejections allowed 
the authors to assess the likelihood that a refused asylum or visa applicant would later turn up as 
apprehended irregular migrant (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). The dataset included 200 origin 
countries with the number of apprehensions used as the best proxy for the unknown true number 
of irregular migrants (Czaika & Holbolth, 2016). The aim was not to arrive at estimates of the 
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‘true’ absolute number of irregular flows, but to arrive at valid approximations and get the relevant 
rankings rights (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016).  
Limitations to the dataset include: numbers may underestimate the actual entry of irregular 
migrants as the number of apprehensions depends on the amount, quality and effectiveness of 
government resources to policing and detecting irregular migrants (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016). The 
authors attempt to circumnavigate this by controlling for resources dedicated to the apprehension 
of irregular migrants using the relative size of police forces in different countries as proxies for 
this (Czaika & Hobolth, 2016).  
Senegal-EU migration 
Vickstrom (2014) analyses three pathways into irregularity (entry without a visa, over-staying a 
visa, and befallen irregularity) using data from the legal-status histories of Sengalese migrants in 
France, Italy and Spain from the 2018 Migration between Africa and Europe Senegal survey 
dataset1. This dataset contained interviews with 603 current Senegalese migrants in France, Italy 
and Spain and 1,065 individuals in Dakar including 59 returned migrants. The dataset includes 
complete year by year residential and administrative histories of each respondent along with 
socio-demographic data (Vickstrom, 2014). Derived from this, Vickstrom’s (2014) analytic sample 
includes 768 individual and destination specific trips as the unit of analysis.  
Findings include: 
• Context (destination and period of arrival) was important in structuring pathways that 
occurred early in the migrant’s trajectory (no-visa entry and overstaying) than subsequent 
transitions to irregularity. 
• The no-visa entry pathway was more likely in Spain and Italy than in France. 
• Migrants entering with a visa were more likely to overstay and transition to fully irregular 
first status and find informal employment in Italy and Spain, than in France. 
• There was no direct relationship between context and befallen irregularity.  
• There was no association between entry status and befallen irregularity i.e. status 
transitions later in Senegalese migrants’ stays at destination were not related to the 
mode of entry. 
• Legal statuses are sticky: migrants with fully regular status were less likely to transition to 
irregular status than those with semi-irregular states. This suggests fully regular status is 
difficult to lose once gained.  
Overall, this paints a pictures whereby entry with a visa, not irregular entry, is closely related to 
first-status irregularity in southern Europe, but is unrelated to later transitions into irregular status 
(Vickstrom, 2014). Connections to institutions in the destination country influence transitions into 
full irregularity, for example, having children or a spouse in the destination country was 
associated with a reduced probability of over-staying into first-status irregularity, possibly 
because migrants might be able to access regular status through legal provisions for family 
attachment (Vickstrom, 2014).  
                                                 
1 More information on this survey dataset can be found here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/dataset/ds00111_en 
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Modelling the effects of restrictive policies 
Simon et al.’s (2018) paper uses primary data collected in Jamaica, an origin country, to calibrate 
their agent-based computational model to estimate the substitution effects of restrictive migration 
policies. Findings include:  
• Restrictions on student and high-skilled workers visa categories are not necessarily 
effective as these individuals are likely to be able to migrate through other regular 
pathways; 
• Restrictions on family-based visas have large substitution effects, re-orientating migrants 
into irregular pathways  
• Restrictions on low-skilled workers also re-orientate migrants to irregular pathways, but at 
a lower magnitude than restrictions on family-based visas (Simon et al., 2018).   
 Expanding regular pathways: work-related migration  
Increasing or expanding regular labour mobility pathways is a key focus within the literature 
consulted for this review. This is potentially, because according to International Labour 
Organization (ILO) data, the search for work is the primary motive for the majority of the world’s 
international migrants (Newland & Riester, 2018). Regular labour pathways are generally more 
accessible to high-skilled workers than low-skilled workers (Newland & Riester, 2018). This can 
create incentives for irregular migration due to rising labour demands in low-paid work and 
sectors in destination countries including agriculture, care and construction (Newland & Riester, 
2018). The inadequacy of legal means to fill the demand for migrant labour is the major factor 
driving irregular migration, but policies about family reunification and access to asylum also affect 
unauthorised flows (Newland & Riester, 2018).  
Existing low-skilled labour mobility pathways can be based on colonial or cultural ties, or on 
supply and demand for labour (e.g. Asian labourers moving to the Gulf States) (Newland & 
Riester, 2018). Regular pathways tend to be more available for male-workers than female ones 
as low-skilled women migrants tend to work in non-seasonal, non-temporary sectors such as 
care for children and the elderly (Newland & Riester, 2018). Consequently, female workers can 
be particularly vulnerable as these sectors lack regular pathways (Newland & Riester, 2018). A 
2018 ESCAP report on migration in the Asia-Pacific argues that women may resort 
disproportionality to irregular migration channels due to restrictions on their migration. Hennebry 
(2017) argues that a lack of regular migration pathways combined with the lack of access to 
decent work create conditions for exploitation of women migrant workers. Consequently, 
enhancing access to regular migration and decent work are the ways to address systemic 
patterns of exploitation and discrimination (Hennebry, 2017).  
Opening regular labour migration pathways as a pathway to reduce irregular migration is based 
on the assumption of a re-routing effect whereby migrants who would otherwise arrive and enter 
the asylum system or stay in a country without legal status will be incentivised to try and access 
a legal work permit from home rather than migrate illegally (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018). Additionally 
assumptions underpinning calls for increasing legal pathways for low-skilled labour migration 
including sparing migrants the abuse and violence that can occur on irregular migration routes 
and further development in origin countries as migrants’ send wages home (Newland & Riester, 
2018). Within existing regular pathways destination countries normally operate temporary 
employment programmes for low-skilled workers: some programmes have been criticised for 
failing to safeguard worker’s rights (Newland & Riester, 2018).  
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Newland & Riester’s (2018) policy brief identifies a number of potential benefits that could flow 
from facilitating low-skilled migration. However, they posit that in the short-term expanding 
regular pathways may actually increase irregular migration as it could thicken the networks that 
help people to migrate. In the medium-term, it will depend on the capacity of legal pathways to 
accommodate the number of low-skilled workers who want to migrate, but lack permission to 
enter their desired destination; and, in the long-term it will depend on a number of complex 
factors in the countries of destination.  
US-Mexico labour mobility pathways and enforcement  
The example of USA-Mexico labour migration pathways, both regular and irregular, are 
referenced frequently in the relevant literature. Clemens and Gough’s (2018) briefing paper for 
the Center for Global Development argues that whilst there is little hard evidence that regular 
migration channels can essentially substitute for irregular channels, but the US-Mexico example 
illustrates that under demographic and economic pressure substantial legal channels for 
economic migration were necessary to curb irregular migration. However, these legal labour 
mobility pathways only suppressed irregular migration when combined with robust enforcement 
efforts (Clemens & Gough, 2018). The relationship works both ways: for legal channels to 
effectively alter the incentives for irregular migration they must be combined with enhanced 
immigration enforcement, and, enforcement efforts are only broadly successful when coupled 
with expanded channels for regular migration (Clemens & Gough, 2018). The briefing paper 
draws on and updates the statistical data from a 2016 working group report on regulating US-
Mexico labour mobility (Gutierrez et al. 2016). 
Gutierrez et al. (2016) compared statistical data from a number of sources including the US 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the US Customs and Border Protection for the time 
period 1942- 2015, to compare the number of temporary work visas issued to Mexicans by the 
US and the number of apprehensions of Mexicans who had migrated irregularly. Measuring 
apprehensions is different from measuring irregular flows (Gutierrez et al., 2016). There is, 
however,some historical evidence that shows that changes in illegal flows mirrored the changes 
in apprehensions over the studied timeframe (Gutierrez et al., 2016). Comparing the number of 
temporary work visas and the number of apprehensions illustrates an inverse relationship.  
Clemens and Gough (2018) summarise four phases in the Mexico-US bilateral migration flow 
between 1942 and 2016: 
• 1942-1953: rising visas alongside low enforcement resulting in rising regular and irregular 
migration (due to the design of the bilateral labour mobility programme, which provided 
incentives for employers to hire employees through the black market). 
• 1954-1964: ample visas alongside tight enforcement resulting in an immediate and near 
collapse in irregular migration. Changes to the labour mobility programme meant that 
employers shifted to hiring migrants through regular channels and migrant had incentives 
to move via regular channels, within a strict enforcement regime.  
• 1965-2000: few visas alongside low enforcement resulted in a large wave of irregular 
migration. Ending the bilateral labour mobility programme, ended the availability of nearly 
all low-skilled US work visas to Mexicans. Combined with demographic pressures, this 
move created enormous pressures for irregular migration. 
• 2001-present: rising visas alongside rising enforcement has resulted in the lowest 
incidence of irregular migration at the border in a half-century. 
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• Expansion in the use of seasonal work visas has directly coincided with a collapse in 
irregular migration pressures.  
Contextualising the statistical data illustrates that demographic and economic pressures can 
drive migration (Clemens & Gough, 2018).  
Germany’s Western Balkans Regulation 
Established in 2015 and due to run until 2020, Germany’s Western Balkans Regulation opened 
the labour market to nationals from six countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia) who were arriving in Germany in large numbers with almost 
no chance of receiving asylum (since 2010, only 1% had qualified for some form of protection) 
(Bither & Ziebarth, 2018). The scheme’s pre-requisites for a temporary work visa were a valid job 
offer by an employer in Germany, subject to a standard priority check for third country nationals, 
and the applicant could not have received any benefits under the German asylum system in the 
24 months prior to applying for a work permit: there were no minimum skill or qualification 
requirements (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018).  
Drawing on publicly available data, fieldwork and 28 background interviews in Germany, Kosovo 
and Serbia, Bither and Ziebarth’s (2018) policy paper argues that it is difficult to assess the 
impact of the scheme. The number of asylum applications from the Western Balkans did drop 
after the regulation’s introduction from 120,882 first-time asylum applications in 2015 to 10,915 
applications in 2017 (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018). Between 2016 and 2017, 117,123 valid work 
contracts for applicants from the Western Balkans were pre-approved by the Federal 
Employment Agency (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018). Of these 51% were for unskilled and low-skilled 
work and 42% for skilled (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018). In 2017, 42% of pre-approvals were in the 
construction sector, with large numbers also in the hospitality and health sectors (Bither & 
Ziebarth, 2018). However, during this period only 44,093 received visas, potentially due to 
process issues including embassies not being equipped with the resources to deal with the large 
increases in demands for visas (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018).  
It is difficult to determine the exact causal role of the regulation in reducing the number of asylum 
applicants and irregular migration to Germany as it was part of a number of policy measures 
including restrictions, faster processing times for asylum applications and the closure of the 
Western Balkans route (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018). Across the six Balkan countries, there were 
significant differences: for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina there were lower number of asylum 
applications between 2015 and 2017 and higher numbers of applications for pre-approvals, 
whereas in Kosovo there were high number of both asylum applications and pre-approvals 
(Bither & Ziebarth, 2019). This indicates that many different variable may play a role, for 
example, diaspora networks play a role in communication and contract facilitation and should be 
considered when crafting migration policy (Bither & Ziebart, 2018). 
There were a number of process issues in implementing the policy including under-defined 
responsibilities between different agencies, no monitoring or information collection mechanisms 
(which would have provided data for evaluation), and an unclear communication strategy towards 
or in the Western Balkans countries (this left space for dubious information from local recruiters 
and informal networks) (Bither & Ziebart, 2018). There were also some concerns regarding 
abuse of the system including alleged abuse of workers or administrative offences (Bither & 
Ziebarth, 2018). The Regulation was also the result of political bargaining between German 
political parties and was not the result of a clear migration logic: there was no common 
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understanding of how the regulation would specifically influence the scale and type of migration 
to Germany (Bither & Ziebarth, 2018).  
 Protection pathways 
Human rights advocates are concerned that destination states’ restrictive migration regimes 
could adversely affect refugees and those seeking protection, pushing them into irregular 
migration (Papademetriou & Sommerville, 2014). A 2018 OECD-UNHCR report on third-country 
solutions for refugees argues that non-humanitarian complementary pathways (e.g. family 
reunification, education and labour mobility) may provide avenues for refugees to access 
international protection and solutions. Refugees face a number of challenges accessing 
complementary pathways (OECD-UNHCR, 2018). Quantitative data on the types of permits 
issued to refugee populations can highlight these challenges and help to increase accessibility 
and predictability of these pathways (OECD-UNHCR, 2018).  
OECD-UNHCR (2018) analyses the quality of the available data and identifies gap and data 
limitations. The study focuses on permits issued for the first time for family reunification, work or 
study between 2010-2017 by OECD countries to five refugee populations, Afghanistan, Eritrea, 
Iraq, Somalia and Syria (OECD-UNHCR, 2018).  Data limitations include data was available for 
34 of the 36 OECD countries, including Turkey, which is the OECD country hosting the largest 
number of refugees so there is a risk of underestimating; risks of overestimation as for some 
OECD countries permit renewals could not be removed from the figures; and a breakdown by 
family permit was not available for the majority of OECD countries in the study (OECD-UNHCR, 
2018).  
Key findings from the study include: 
• There is significant scope for expanding the use of complementary pathways; 
• 86% of permits granted were for family reunification: this points to the need to continue 
decreasing barriers to family reunification e.g. by streamlining procedures; 
• The use of work and study pathways were relatively modest, suggesting that legal, 
administrative and practical obstacles currently prevent refugees from accessing these 
pathways.  
• The use and collection of data support efforts to achieve solutions for refugees (OECD-
UNHCR, 2018).  
 Potential policy options 
A small but growing body of literature has been produced by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) outlining a number of potential legal migration policy options that could reduce 
irregular migration. Evidence in this subset draws on existing schemes or pilots. McAuliffe and 
Solomon’s (2017) convened set of papers under the IOM’s Migration Research Leaders’ 
Syndicate presents a number of ideas for regular migration pathways, including: 
• Humanitarian alternative pathways: a number of schemes have been adopted or 
proposed in Latin America including resettlement in solidarity (developed as a response 
to Colombia’s refugee crisis but since expanded to extra-continental refugees, mainly 
Palestinians and Syrians); humanitarian entry visas (established by Brazil in 2010 as a 
response to the Haitian earthquake and expanded in 2013 to include refugees from 
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Syria: Argentina has established a similar programme for Syrians); humanitarian 
residency permits (adopted across Latin America to assist Haitians and Venezuelans); 
regional residency permits (as part of the MERCOSUR customs union); and, regional 
citizenship (a proposed initiative) (Jubilut, 2017). Evaluations of these schemes’ impacts 
on irregular migration were not found during the course of this review. The schemes have 
a number of positive features, however, a number of them are small in scale. For 
example, resettlement in solidarity reached just over 1,500 people between 2004 and 
2014 (see Jubilut, 2017). 
• A sectoral approach to labour migration: particularly in the care and agricultural 
sectors in EU countries where the demand for migrant labour is high and the risk of 
irregular employment is pervasive. As demand is high and supply is low in these sectors, 
there is a need to open up legal migration channels as well as measures to combat 
labour exploitation and abuse (Triandafyllidou, 2017).    
• Human development visas: McAuliffe (2017) argues these offer an adaptable and 
sustainable solution for migrants and states. Elements include a centralised ballot-based 
selection of migrants with an annual quota based on factors such as labour market 
conditions; eligibility based on citizenship of a participating state with the destination state 
imposing specific health and security checks; accompanying family provisions; links to 
additional development assistance (e.g. community-based projects or schemes); and 
specific visa conditions related to work or length of stay (McAuliffe, 2017). As this paper 
is a technical paper proposing how the scheme could work, there is no empirical data.  
Triandafyllidou et al. (2019) discussion paper identifies some of the dynamics linking regular 
and irregular migration and outlines how they could be addressed by relevant policies. It reviews 
four sets of approaches and policies:  
• Enhanced regional mobility regimes work best when placed within wider economic 
and political frameworks e.g. the EU. 84% of migration movements in West Africa are 
directed towards another country in the region and the Economic Community of West 
Africa States has moved towards implementing a regional mobility regime, however, 
there have been administrative hurdles e.g. only 7 out of the 15 countries have issued 
the relevant travel document. Within the Association of Southeast Asian States, there has 
been large-scale tolerance of exploitation of migrant fisheries workers.  
• Bilateral mobility schemes including the EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership, normally 
address seasonal/temporary needs in particular sectors, e.g. agriculture, or regulate 
more long-term relationships between two countries and can include flexible forms of 
circularity. These schemes can play a role in preventing irregular flows as they offer 
regular channels to prospective migrants.  
• Sponsorship schemes including labour migrants with job offers, migrants seeking 
employment, refugees seeking resettlement in a third country. Sponsorship can be 
private (e.g. families or individuals), public (e.g. the states) or NGOs. Optimal 
sponsorship arrangements need to be supported and monitored by State structures. 
Sponsorship schemes are smart and flexible mechanisms that can develop in different 
directions to address both migration and asylum seeking pressures. Schemes also exist 
for low-skilled migration and in some cases can be open to abuse e.g. the Kafala system, 
employer sponsorship programme in the Middle East, particularly Lebanon and Jordan. 
New ideas for refugee sponsorship included UNHCR’s skilled-refugee visa.   
• Humanitarian corridors including state-based, faith-based and NGO schemes. The 
concern is whether these types of schemes could function on a regular or sustained 
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basis. Efficiency of schemes such as the 2018 EU large-scale evacuation scheme for 
migrants in vulnerable conditions in Libya are yet to be demonstrated. There are also 
examples of regularisation schemes which seek to reduce the vulnerability e.g. 2018 
scheme in United Arab Emirates and Dubai to offer extendable one-year visas to people 
who have overstayed their previous visas if they come from countries affected by war or 
natural disasters. Regularisation mechanisms are a tool for addressing vulnerability in 
exceptional circumstances.  
Triandafyllidou et al.  (2019) argue that in order to deter irregular migration states should adopt 
flexible migration regimes, which include a variable geometry approach (e.g. different types of 
schemes for different types of migrants and for different sets of countries); a smart approach 
(understanding the contextual factors that drive irregular migration when regular pathways are 
not available); and, a balanced approach that responds to labour markets and other 
considerations of destination countries, developed in cooperation with origin countries and 
acknowledges the needs of migrants and their families.  
The report also suggests a number of new regular migration policy options including temporary 
migration partnerships (to address some of the problems with bilateral migration partnerships 
e.g. poor living and working conditions for migrants), skills and mobility partnerships (drawing on 
the Global Skill Partnerships’ approach whereby the destination country invests in training 
partnerships in the country of origin) and human development visa schemes.  
Papademetriou and Sommerville’s (2014) Migration Policy Institute report on policy tools to 
address immigration harms outlines a number of possible links between regular and irregular 
migration. For example, early interventions, which seek to reduce illegal immigration flows before 
they reach a country’s border may unintentionally increase the profits for criminal enterprises, 
indirectly encouraging them to facilitate illegal migration (Papademetriou & Sommerville, 2014). 
Conversely, expanding legal routes could reduce crime by lowering the profits for actors 
facilitating irregular entry (Papademetriou & Sommerville, 2014).  
Papademetriou and Sommerville (2014) argue that it is “too simplistic to just open up significant 
new legal immigration channels” (p. 13). For example, network effects could mean that expanded 
regular pathways increase demands for both regular and irregular migration, whilst certain 
regular pathways (e.g. for domestic workers) are open to abuse (Papademetriou & Sommerville, 
2014). As such three types of policy measure would be needed:  
• Expanding legal channels: legal channels could be opened to economic sectors in 
periods of high demand or were firms could not operate without immigrant labour. Careful 
selection of which occupations or source countries to target should help divert illegal 
flows through legal channels more effectively. 
• Increasing flexibility within the system to mitigate drivers of illegality: complex and time-
consuming visa renewal procedures can push authorised workers into illegal status even 
if they are eligible for a new visa. Policy options such as reducing administrative barriers 
to switching visas could help reduce avoidable illegality.  
• Simplifying the system: employers sometimes do not comply with immigration laws 
because they are too burdensome, for example, the USA’s H2-A visa for temporary 
agricultural workers (Papademetriou & Sommerville, 2014). 
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